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Art helps Nature, by reducing such wild, austere, and dangerous
Ground, into a pliable, fine, fertile and, sound Earth.
–William Ellis1
Without the benefit of statutory or regulatory definitions of “nature,” courts
and federal agencies have long improvised, roughly applying an “I’ll know it
when I see it” approach.2 Such an approach implicitly invokes cultural norms,
which in Western tradition means defining nature by setting it against man and
man’s interventions.3 As a result, litigation across a variety of fields defines
what is “natural” by the extent of intervention and manipulation something
experiences.4 The Supreme Court recently grappled with this problem. In Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,5 the Court addressed the
question of whether isolating DNA is an “inventive act” that entitles the first
person to isolate DNA with the right to a patent.6 The Court applied the “law of
nature exception” to patentability, which exempts laws of nature, abstract ideas,

1. WILLIAM ELLIS, AGRICULTURE IMPROV’D: OR, THE PRACTICE OF HUSBANDRY
DISPLAY’D 43 (London, T. Osborne 1745).
2. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart
noted that that even though he could not define “pornography,” he “know[s] it when [he] see[s] it .
. . .” Id.
3. See Franklin Ginn & David Demeritt, Nature: A Contested Concept, in KEY CONCEPTS
IN GEOGRAPHY 300, 302–03 (Gill Valentine et al. eds., 2009) (noting that nature is defined as the
absence of “any trace of humans and their artifice”).
4. See infra Part I.A (summarizing the cases and regulations addressing use of the term
“natural”).
5. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
6. See id. at 2114–15.
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and natural phenomena.7 The case highlights the difficulty of determining just
how much human action makes something “unnatural.”8
The stakes are high, because understanding what it means for a product to be
“all natural” is extremely valuable in the marketplace and of great significance
to everyday consumers.9 For example, natural products are hot commodities in
the marketplace,10 which makes defining what is natural a priority.
Simultaneously, the current rules regarding natural products, or the lack thereof,
send many corporate competitors to court over what constitutes a “natural”
product.11 The National Products Association made “defining natural” a priority

7. Id. at 2117.
8. See id. at 2119–20 (limiting the holding to isolated DNA and failing to extend it to cases
in which a company is seeking a method patent, the application of knowledge is at issue, or DNA
is altered). Notably, the Court’s attempt to define “natural” in Myriad Genetics is viewed by some
as the most significant decision in the field of intellectual property in 2013. See, e.g., Warren
Woessner, Top Ten Intellectual Property Stories from 2013, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/top-ten-intellectual-property-stories-2013.
9. Courts hold that consumers are entitled to rely on those “all natural” big-print
representations on the front of packaging. See, e.g., Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934,
939 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “reasonable consumers should [not] be expected to look beyond
misleading representations on the front of the box to discover the truth”).
10. See ERIN SILVA ET AL., UW-MADISON CTR. FOR INTEGRATED AGRIC. SYS., ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE IN WISCONSIN: 2012 STATUS REPORT 12 (2012), available at http://www.ci
as.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/org12finalnewlowres021612.pdf. Since at least 2000,
substantial organic and natural food markets have emerged within the United States with an average
growth rate of almost seventeen percent per year between 2000 and 2010. Id. American organic
food sales make up almost half of sales worldwide, and the global organic food market more than
tripled between 2000 and 2009. Id. See also Press Release, Organic Trade Ass’n, ConsumerDriven U.S. Organic Market Surpasses $31 Billion in 2011 (Apr. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.organicnewsroom.com/2012/04/us_consumerdriven_organic_mark.html;
Dana Hunsinger Benbow, Natural, Organic Items Grab Bigger Share in Supermarkets, USA
TODAY (July 8, 2012, 2:04 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/story/
2012-07-07/natural-organic-groceries/56085280/1.
11. For example, Naked Juice settled a class action regarding product labeling. See Pappas
v. Naked Juice Co. of Gendora, Inc., No. LA CV11-08276 JAK, 2012 WL 1925598, at *1–2 (C.D.
Cal. May 14, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 14-55289 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2014). The German
chocolate company, Ritter, is also defending an accusation that it used synthetic ingredients. See
Dan Charles, Top German Chocolate Maker Fights for its ‘Natural’ Reputation, NPR (Dec. 24,
2013, 8:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/12/23/256587064/top-german-chocolatemaker-fights-for-its-natural-reputation. Buitoni pastas just avoided a class action suit over its all
natural labels. See Pelayo v. Nestlé USA, Inc., No. CV 13-5213-JFW(AJWx), 2013 WL 5764644
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (dismissing a complaint against Nestlé that alleged the all natural labels
on Buitoni pastas were deceptive).
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for 2014,12 while major publications such as Forbes,13 Newsweek,14 and the Wall
Street Journal15 cover stories about confusion and frustration for both consumers
and industries.16 Even courts tire of litigation that could be avoided with some
assistance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Some judges stay
claims and refer the matters to the FDA for an administrative ruling.17
Unfortunately, the road forward is not quite as clear as these cases might suggest
because the FDA is not the only cook in the kitchen. Defining “nature” impacts
disparate areas of law including patents, gemstone classification, cosmetics, and
international trade. This broad range of application implicates numerous federal
agencies, each of which struggles to create its own definition of nature, leading
to structural isolation from each agency’s counterparts.
In defining “nature,” many agencies fail to reference the substantial literature
discussing what is “natural” from historical and social science perspectives, even
though the literature insightfully isolates the philosophical quandaries that
generate very real-world problems.18 According to many scholars, our cultural
history generates definitions that rely on a man/nature dichotomy, and that
dichotomy creates important social consequences.19 From a legal perspective,
critical social consequences of the dichotomy include downplaying the potential
12. John Shaw, Defining ‘Natural’ is a Priority for NPA in 2014, NUTRA INGREDIENTSUSA (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.nutraingredients-usa.com/Regulation/Defining-natural-is-apriority-for-NPA-in-2014.
13. See James McWilliams, With the ‘All Natural’ Label under Fire, Consumers are Left in
the Dark, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesmcwilliams/
2013/11/14/with-the-all-natural-label-under-fire-consumers-are-left-in-the-dark/ (noting that many
companies stopped using the term “natural” because of its vagueness, which leads to the possibility
of lawsuits).
14. See Matthew Mientka, The Unnatural Death of ‘Natural’ Labeling, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25,
2013, http://www.newsweek.com/unnatural-death-natural-labeling-207164 (explaining that the
word natural has no legal definition, which allows food producers to use it deceptively).
15. See Mike Esterl, The Natural Evolution of Food Labels, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2013, at B1
(explaining that food companies are removing the word natural from food labels because they fear
litigation).
16. Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut introduced a Senate bill that, if passed, will
strengthen labeling requirements for foods. See Food Labeling Modernization Act of 2013, S.
1653, 113th Cong. § 4(a) (2013).
17. See Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185-JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118225,
at *29–30 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (granting a stay of the action and referring the matter to the
FDA for an administrative determination regarding whether the soup at issue could be labeled
natural); Van Atta v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv-02815-MSK-MJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
118137, at *10 (D. Colo. July 18, 2013) (granting a stay of the action until the FDA issued a
recommendation requested in an earlier case), accepted in part, rejected in part, and stay granted
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119119 (D. Colo. Aug. 5, 2013); Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502
YGR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97207, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (referring the issue to the FDA
to determine whether products with bioengineered seed can be labeled natural).
18. See Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 3, at 301, 304–05 (discussing different theories of nature
and movements that addressed the definition of “nature”).
19. Id. at 303 (noting that the difference in cultural approaches creates ambiguity over how
the idea of nature should be interpreted).

2014]

The Jurisprudence of Nature

921

for man to deeply change elements of nature, such as the climate.
Simultaneously, because the man/nature dichotomy is false, agencies are left to
define nature by looking to a nuanced scale of human actions such as isolating,
discovering, purifying, locating, synthesizing, and fermenting. The proliferation
of limited definitions of what is natural within narrow legal spheres means each
agency individually struggles with measuring the kind, quality, and quantity of
human modifications and interventions to define “nature.”20 A comparative
history of the jurisprudence of defining “nature,” augmented with reflections
from historical and sociological literature, is critical to developing a thoughtful
and reasonably consistent narrative within the law. Such a narrative will create
predictable outcomes.
This Article analyzes historical approaches to defining “nature” and suggests
that a new definition of “nature,” based on property rights, should be adopted.
Disentangling historical approaches reveals the enduring challenges of using a
scale ranging from what originates in nature to the artificial in determining what
is truly natural. While using such a scale may be unavoidable within the
industries of foods, cosmetics, and drugs, improvements can be made to promote
predictability and consistency. In other industries, the language of property
rights may be a more appropriate substitute for defining “nature,” similarly
increasing both predictability and consistency. In any event, such interventions
pave the way for avoiding the socio-cultural consequences of defining “nature”
as the exclusion of man.
Part I of the Article discusses historical efforts to define, or avoid defining,
“nature” across federal agencies. It briefly considers the intersections of these
definitions in addition to the impact of disparate approaches. Part II analyzes
the challenges agencies face in defining “nature.” The analysis begins with
investigating how the natural/human binary21 contrasts with the human action
spectrum and considers how evidence of long-standing human intervention in
ecosystems demonstrates the difficulty of applying the spectrum in the real
world. Part III turns to history, philosophy, and the social sciences to investigate
critiques of the binary man/nature definition and its cultural consequences. Part
IV applies these critiques to the problem of creating a legal definition of “nature”
while taking into account the social consequences of the binary man/nature
definition, such as the pressure to justify human interventions in ecosystems in
all circumstances. The Article concludes in Part V by suggesting that definitions
of “nature” should rely on the language of property rights rather than the
man/nature binary.
20. See, e.g., id. (discussing the Food Standards Agency (FSA)’s struggle to define “natural”).
21. In addition to patent law, binaries, or “bilateral dialogues,” also exist in the field of
geography, in which geographers increasingly recognize binaries as significant to the development
of the field and to popular understandings of key geographical concepts. See Paul Cloke & Ron
Johnston, Deconstructing Human Geography’s Binaries, in SPACES OF GEOGRAPHICAL THOUGHT:
DECONSTRUCTING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY’S BINARIES 1, 11 (Paul Cloke & Ron Johnston eds.,
2005).
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I. LEGISLATING NATURE ACROSS DIVERSE AREAS OF LAW
The natural designation impacts monetary profits, whether in patent law,
where the exception can defeat patentability, or in the manufacture and sale of
products, where the designation commands an increasing portion of markets.22
In any event, federal agencies increasingly tangle with the question of what is
natural and are beginning to elaborate upon, even if only informally, definitions
of this key concept.
A. Non-Patentability of Natural Phenomena: Distinguishing Between What
Occurs Naturally and the Human Application of Natural Phenomena
Section 101 of the Patent Act states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”23 In light of Congressional intention
that the Act “include anything under the sun that is made by man,”24 the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Act broadly,25 but has excluded “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patent coverage.26 This exclusion exists
because these concepts form the basis of all scientific and technological
processes.27 The Court is careful to caution, however, that “too broad an
interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law[]
[because] all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”28
While the Court has not attempted to specifically articulate a definition, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) defines a natural thing as
“the handiwork of nature” and something that “occurs without the hand of

22. Bryan Resnick, Why is Myriad Genetics Still Filing Patent Suits for Breast-Cancer Tests?,
NAT’L J., Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/why-is-myriad-genetics-stillfiling-patent-suits-for-breast-cancer-tests-20130808.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
24. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399.
25. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In choosing such expansive
terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”).
26. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). This Article focuses on the natural
phenomena and law of nature exception, which is distinct from the “abstract ideas” exception. See
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 954 F. Supp. 2d 509, 525–26 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (finding
that defendant was only asserting “application of the ‘abstract ideas’ exception” with regard to
certain claims, and advancing other claims on the basis of different exceptions). Similarly, this
Article pursues the law of nature exception only to the extent that it comingles or overlaps with the
natural phenomena exception. Other cases more squarely within the law of nature, line, such as
those involving mathematical formulas, are omitted. See, e.g., Oleksy v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 06C-01245, 2013 WL 3233259, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2013) (analyzing, in part, whether a
mathematical formula included an inventive step that was patentable).
27. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
28. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
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man.”29 This definition suggests that something must occur in nature or must
exist without significant human alteration or manufacture to be natural. This
touchstone definition for what is “natural” references the spectrum of potential
human actions with respect to a process or product, which ranges from natural
to artificial. As a result, this definition reflects a dichotomy between those
products and ideas that have nominal modifications and those that are
substantially the result of human efforts. A threshold exists along this spectrum
that must be surpassed for patent eligibility.30 Further complicating the matter,
the Court recognizes that application of a “law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”31
The Court interpreted the nature exception in a series of cases over a span of
fifty years: Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,32 Diamond v.
Chakrabarty,33 and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.34
In Funk Bros., the Court considered whether a mixture of different, naturally
occurring, bacteria that could inoculate plant seeds fell within the law of nature
exception.35 In this context, the Court said the patentee merely made a
“discovery” by locating an “unknown phenomenon of nature,” which needed to
be used for a new purpose or applied to something further in order to become
patentable.36 Thus, although Funk Brothers used their discovery to create a new
mixture of bacteria, the Court refused the patent, finding that the new mixture
was merely a discovery because its natural behaviors remain unchanged.37 The
Court suggested that a patent may have been properly issued if Funk Brothers
29. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2016.01(III) (8th ed. 2001); see also Ex parte Grayson, 51 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 413, 414 (B.P.A.I. 1941) (rejecting the patent claim for a fresh shrimp product as a natural
substance, noting the claimant’s design “is still in its natural state which has been changed in no
manner”).
30. See Krysta Kauble, Patenting Everything Under the Sun: Invoking the First Amendment
to Limit the Use of Gene Patents, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1123, 1125–26 (2011) (highlighting differences
of opinion with regard to when something experiences so much human intervention that it is no
longer patentable, particularly with regard to gene sequences).
31. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. Further, “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression
of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge
of scientific truth may be.” Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94
(1939).
32. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
33. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
34. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
35. See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
36. Id. at 130 (noting that such a discovery is not entitled to a patent, because the discovery
could have been made by anyone, and the bacteria already existed in nature).
37. Id. at 131 (stating the bacteria’s “use in combination does not improve in any way their
natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided”). The Court acknowledged
that although mixing the bacteria required skill, it did not change the characteristics of the bacteria.
Id. at 132.
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applied the discovery to create a state of inhibition or non-inhibition in the
bacteria,38 improve the bacteria’s natural functioning,39 or create new bacteria.40
Over thirty years later, in Chakrabarty, the Court considered whether a patent
for a live, human-made, genetically engineered bacterium that could break down
crude oil was prohibited under the laws of nature exception.41 The Court
distinguished this patent application from the patent in Funk Bros. on the
grounds that the bacterium at issue was not naturally occurring.42 The Court
stated that, with regard to patent eligibility, the distinction is not between living
and inanimate objects, but between naturally occurring phenomenon and
products created through human ingenuity and invention.43
More recently, the Mayo Court considered whether a process that helps
doctors determine whether a drug dosage level is too low or too high for patients
with autoimmune disease fell within the law of nature exception.44 The Court
determined that the patent claims involved laws of nature because the
relationship between the dosage level and its effect on the human body was an
entirely natural process.45 The Court reiterated the need for human application
of naturally occurring phenomena in order for a patent to issue,46 but only
vaguely defined an “application,” stating that the process would require
“additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”47
Unfortunately, the line between natural phenomenon and its application
remains unclear. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Myriad Genetics

38. See id. at 130 (noting Funk Bros. “does not create a state of inhibition or of non-inhibition
in the bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature. Those qualities are of course not patentable”).
39. See id. at 131.
40. See id. (finding there was “no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement
of the range of their utility”).
41. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
42. See id. at 309–10 (stating that, rather, the bacterium was “a product of human ingenuity”).
43. Id. at 313. The Funk Bros. decision makes sense to any cook: yeast, flour, and warm
water nearly magically yield an entirely different substance when heated, but little of the magic is
attributable to the cook when his actions are compared with the law of nature with regard to the
creation of bread. See H.E. JACOB, SIX THOUSAND YEARS OF BREAD: ITS HOLY AND UNHOLY
HISTORY 17 (Richard & Clara Winston trans., Lyons & Burford 1997) (1944). Is Chakrabarty
different in a way that we can clearly articulate, simply because the “mixing” occurred within the
organism and on a microscopic scale?
44. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
45. Id. at 1296–97 (explaining that the process Prometheus sought to patent involved the
“relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm[,]” and that the metabolization of
the drug by the human body was a natural process).
46. See id. at 1294 (emphasizing the need for an “inventive concept” to ensure nature itself is
not being patented).
47. Id. at 1297.

2014]

The Jurisprudence of Nature

925

emphasizes the problem.48 The Court began by articulating the law of nature
exception to patent eligibility, explaining the rationale behind the exception and
noting the need to have a patent policy that provides incentives to spur invention,
but simultaneously does not inhibit the exchange of information.49 The Court
then considered whether Myriad’s patents were for a new and useful substance
or were not patent eligible because they fell under the natural laws exception.50
While the Court eventually acknowledged the need to evaluate the claim under
the law of nature exception, it avoided offering any explanation of how to locate
the threshold of sufficient human creation/application that distinguishes
invention from natural phenomena.51 The Court explained that Myriad’s
isolation of a useful gene was important, but there was no “act of invention” that
would be patentable because there was no creation.52 Such characterization,
however, fails to adequately characterize actions such as isolating a gene and
identifying the consequences of particular mutations of the gene, which might
resemble both discovery and something more.
In Myriad Genetics, the Court struggled to choose a verb that would precisely
characterize Myriad’s actions with regard to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.
Despite noting that Myriad “separat[ed] [a] gene from its surrounding genetic
material”53 and “isolate[ed]” the relevant DNA,54 the Court eventually found
that Myriad only discovered the location of the genetic sequence of BRCA1 and
BRCA2 and did not change the genes’ characteristics.55 In actuality, by
“uncovering” the genes, Myriad did more than simply find their location; Myriad
connected the genes with a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer, which

48. See Russell E. Cass & Linda R. Friedlieb, Myriad Illuminates High Court’s Approach To
Section 101, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (July 8, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://www.sidley.com/files/
Publication/4a0455a1-3c94-4805-bf1b-b38c1587d83d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7c5c
a151-4633-421d-a72c-bf7b756f2fc5/Cass%20Friedlieb%20Law360.pdf (noting that after Myriad
Genetics, it remains unclear how much human application is required for something to become
patent eligible, though it is clear that the human intervention must be more than added effort, a
routine, or something that is useful to a limited group, such as physicians).
49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1305).
50. Id.
51. See id. at 2120 (limiting the Court’s holding to the finding that genes are not patentable
and refusing to address what is needed to show application of knowledge sufficient to obtain a
patent). See also Cass & Friedlieb, supra note 48 (explaining the Court has left open the question
of what additional features are needed to confer patent eligibility to a natural product).
52. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
53. Id. at 2117.
54. Id. at 2118. Notably, other courts find isolation to be a creative act worthy of patent.
Michael Powell, Supreme Court Rules That a Naturally Occurring DNA Segment is Not Patent
Eligible, but cDNA May Be Patent Eligible, LEXOLOGY (July 2, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=c9022fa6-7323-4063-a751-80e73b66e7f3 (noting that the European Court of
Justice, the highest Court in Europe, confirmed the legality of patenting isolated genes).
55. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2116.
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now allows the company to accurately predict cancer diagnoses and prognoses.56
The testing process required significant monitoring of populations and the
collection of a massive database.57 While individuals and their health outcomes
existed before and without Myriad Genetics, the creation of the database
involved hundreds, if not thousands, of creative decisions required to obtain
precisely the data needed and to ensure its statistical validity.58
The Myriad Genetics Court compared Myriad’s gene isolation to the Funk
Brothers’ combination of naturally occurring bacteria to inoculate plants, and
found that both fell within the law of nature exception.59 The Court appears to
consider Myriad’s actions as a roughly parallel opposite of those in Funk Bros.:
separation rather than combination. Notably, the Court did not consider how
different the applicants’ actions in Funk Bros. and Myriad Genetics might be in
terms of the complexity and creativity. Effort does not appear as a part of the
analysis when determining whether there is an “application” beyond discovery
of the natural phenomenon.
The Court also compared Myriad’s actions to scientists’ actions in
Chakrabarty, where the patent applicant modified a bacterium by adding
plasmids, giving it the ability to break down crude oil.60 In Chakrabarty, the
Court held that a patent could issue because the bacterium was entirely new and
had distinctive characteristics that did not exist in nature, unlike the discovery
in Myriad Genetics in which nothing new was created.61
Prior to Myriad Genetics, the Court seemed to suggest that the line
distinguishing between natural phenomenon and application might be whether
the discovery advanced a “new and useful end,”62 but Myriad Genetics suggests
the analysis is less clear. The Myriad Genetics Court acknowledged that the
discovery was of a “useful gene,” but said that was not enough for a patent,
noting “[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”63
Without a definition of what it means to go beyond the discovery of natural
phenomena, it is likely that future legal battles will focus on the critical verbs
used in the patent application. Similarly, Myriad Genetics’ method of
navigating the natural phenomena exception creates a conflict between that
decision and the traditional exception recognized in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K.

56. See id. at 2117 n.4. See also Gina Kolata, DNA Project Aims to Make Public a Company’s
Data on Cancer Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, at A14 (describing Myriad’s database of DNA
changes that can predict a person’s cancer risk).
57. Kolata, supra note 56, at A14.
58. See id. (explaining that Myriad performed “millions of tests” to compile the database).
59. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
60. Id. at 2116–17.
61. Id. at 2117.
62. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
63. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
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Mulford Co.,64 a case in which a patent was granted for isolating and purifying
a substance that was found in nature.65 Although some argue that such purified
substances are naturally occurring and therefore not patentable,66 many courts
have held that purified forms of substances are not natural and can be patented.67
For example, when reviewing a patent for ultramarine, the Fourth Circuit found
that “[t]he fact[] [] that a new and useful product is the result of processes of
extraction, concentration and purification of natural materials does not defeat its
patentability.”68 The court suggested that the creation of a new and useful
product is vital to patentability, noting that the purified fermentates at issue
would be useless on their own without extra steps making them medically
useful.69 Similarly, the D.C. District Court emphasized utility over creativity
when it acknowledged that l-arterenol is naturally found with other compounds
throughout the body, but held that its existence in a purified form was patentable
because it is only usable in its purified form.70
The memorable “aspirin case,” Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfield
Co.,71 which questioned the validity of a patent issued for aspirin, also dealt with
whether the product was “new.”72 Though novel to Europeans and their
descendants, aspirin was used for centuries by Native American tribes as a
remedy for fevers and is found in willow bark in a less purified form.73 The
patent was challenged in 1910 when a competitor developed a competing

64. 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
65. See id. at 497. Traditionally, courts find purification of naturally occurring products
patentable. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958)
(allowing a patent where new products were created through the fermentation process); In re Bergy,
596 F.2d 952, 996 & n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (finding a pure culture of Streptomyces vellosus used to
create antibiotic patentable); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (reasoning
that the purification of prostaglandin compounds was new enough to merit a patent); Merck & Co.
v. Chase Chem. Co., 273 F. Supp. 68, 69, 89–90 (D.N.J. 1967) (upholding the issuance of a patent
for Vitamin B-12 because the product was sufficiently new); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Watson, 135 F.
Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1955) (upholding a patent for purified 1-arterenol although it existed in
nature in some form).
66. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d at 1401–01.
67. See sources cited supra note 65. The low level of human intervention needed to purify a
substance would suggest that the courts focus more on the “useful” aspect than the “new” aspect of
patentable products, a theory that provides support for the Myriad Genetics decision. See Merck &
Co., 253 F.2d at 164 (discussing the relative ease of purifying a substance compared to creating a
new substance).
68. Merck & Co., 253 F.2d at 163.
69. Id. at 164.
70. Sterling Drug Inc. v. Watson, 135 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1955).
71. 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910).
72. Id. at 702–03.
73. See Eric T. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 19, 34 n.107 (2011); Willow Branches and Other Twigs and Roots, NATIVETECH,
http://www.nativetech.org/willow/willow.htm (last visited May 26, 2014).
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generic version.74 The Seventh Circuit found that aspirin was a “new thing.”75
The primary justification was that the patent holder produced a new and useful
compound that had widespread medical value.76 Cases like Kuehmsted show
that, historically, courts have been willing to grant patents for naturally
occurring substances in a purified form where the substance is used for
something new and useful, and have emphasized the utility of the product rather
than the level of human intervention required for its purification. Myriad
Genetics, however, suggests that human intervention may now be essential to
patentability.
B. The FDA and the Regulation of Natural Foods and Cosmetics
Within federal agencies, the growing demand for natural foods has spurred
the necessity to define what is “natural.” Consumers rely heavily on such terms
when making product choices; products labeled “100% natural” are believed to
be the best available, followed closely by those labeled “all natural
ingredients.”77
When the Food Safety and Inspection Service published Policy Memorandum
055 in 1982, it ushered in the modern guidance system.78 For the purpose of
food labeling, this system defined anything that contained “artificial or
synthetic” ingredients as unnatural.79 In 1991, the FDA established an informal
policy that defined natural foods as those in which “nothing artificial or synthetic
(including colors regardless of source) is included in, or has been added to, the
product that would not normally be expected to be there.”80 The FDA did not
elaborate on the definitions of “artificial” or “synthetic,” even though these
terms form a key part of the definition of “natural” in the informal policy.81 The
FDA’s informal policy is deemed merely an advisory opinion that does not carry
the force of law.82 The FDA also does not have an informal definition of natural

74. Kuehmsted, 179 F. at 702–03.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 705.
77. Josh Ashley, A Bittersweet Deal for Consumers: The Unnatural Application of
Preemption to High Fructose Corn Syrup Labeling Claims, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 235, 236 (2010)
(showing that 31.3% of consumers prefer “100% natural” products, compared to 25.4% preferring
products containing “all natural ingredients” and 14.2% preferring “100% organic” products).
78. See A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies,
Biotechnology Litigation, and the Safety of Imported Food, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 253, 262–63
(2007).
79. Id. at 263.
80. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of
Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466 (Nov. 27, 1991).
81. Id. The FDA sought input from consumers on how to accurately define “natural,” if at
all. Id. at 60,467.
82. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that
“neither the FDA policy statement regarding the use of the term ‘natural,’” nor a letter from the
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that applies to cosmetics.83 Though the FDA considered mandating a formal
definition for natural in 1991,84 no definition has been issued to date.85 The FDA
justifies the lack of a formal definition by citing the difficulty of defining the
term, given that most food has been processed in some way.86 The FDA’s
informal definition continues to be a part of the legal lexicon of “natural”—a
word that carries market value—and is, therefore, the focus of litigation,
particularly between competitors. Recent cases pertain to products containing
high fructose corn syrup, genetically modified organisms, artificial
preservatives, and those processed with chemicals or containing other unnatural
ingredients.87 Another recent case questioned whether the use of common
vitamin names was misleading when the vitamins included synthetic ingredients
and the product was labeled “all natural.”88
In other cases involving non-food products, the courts have refused to make a
determination about whether an “all natural” label was false.89 Some courts are
forced to create their own definition of “natural” because of the FDA’s failure
to promulgate a definition;90 when courts have asked the FDA to weigh in on the

FDA classifying the contested product as natural, were operable because they lacked the “force of
law”).
83. See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting
the lack of either a formal or informal definition of “natural” in the cosmetics context). See also
Paul M. Hyman & Samina N. Rodriguez, Regulation of Labeling and Advertising Claims, in
COSMETIC REGULATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 43, 46–47 (Norman F. Estrin & James
M. Akerson eds., 2000) (“There is no definition in . . . FDA regulations of the term natural as used
to describe a cosmetic product or ingredient.”).
84. See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of
Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. at 60,466.
85. See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of
Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of
Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2407 (Jan. 6, 1993) (“Because of resource limitations and other agency
priorities, [the] FDA is not undertaking rulemaking to establish a definition for ‘natural’ at this
time.”).
86. What is the Meaning of ‘Natural’ on the Label of Food, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm214868.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2012)
[hereinafter What is the Meaning of Natural?] (noting that the FDA does not object when “natural”
is used to classify products that are free of “added color, artificial flavors, or synthetic substances”).
87. See Dawn Goulet, Confusion in Courts Over “All Natural” Claims, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG.:
CLASS ACTIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS (Apr. 30, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/classactions/articles/spring2012-0412-all-natural-labels-mean-marketing.html
(discussing emerging lawsuits concerning the definition of “natural”).
88. See Hairston v. South Beach Beverage Co., No. CV 12-1429-JFW (DTBx), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 74279, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2012).
89. See, e.g., Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(refusing to determine whether a natural label on cosmetics was false or misleading without FDA
guidance).
90. See, e.g., Janney v. Mills, 944 F. Supp. 2d 806, 813 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (stating that waiting
for the FDA to develop its own definition would be “futile”).
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meaning of “natural,” the agency has declined to do so.91 Notably, in 2008, the
FDA announced it would leave “natural” undefined, despite continued confusion
over the definition.92
As a result, class actions continue to center on the proper use of the word
natural in food and cosmetics advertising.93 Yet, such actions have failed to gain
much traction in the courts. Stymied by the lack of a definition, cases thus far
are stayed pending FDA input,94 languish waiting for a ruling on motions and/or
procedural matters,95 or are resolved through either a voluntary dismissal by the
plaintiffs96 or a settlement agreement.97 There is an additional challenge for
certain avenues of products liability litigation because products labeled “all
natural” may not be deemed defective if a synthetic element is included; the
inclusion is intentional.98 Similarly, labels defining a product as “all natural”
91. See Order Lifting Stay at 1, 3, Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., 2010 WL 2539386 (D.N.J.
June 15, 2010) (No. 08-2797 (JBS)), 2010 WL 2539386, at *1 [hereinafter Order Lifting Stay]
(incorporating into a court order a letter from the FDA refusing Judge Jerome Simandle’s request
to define the word “natural”). Although government agencies have not formally defined “natural,”
they define phrases that include the term “natural.” For example, the FDA has a definition for
“natural flavor.” See 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(3) (2011).
92. See April Lynn Farris, The “Natural” Aversion: The FDA’s Reluctance to Define a
Leading Food-Industry Marketing Claim, and the Pressing Need for a Workable Rule, 65 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 403, 407 (2010). Some manufacturers seem less inclined to seek formal definitions.
Quaker Oats recently argued that “wholesome” was a term of “puffery,” and thus, presumably,
without meaning about the healthfulness of its products. Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F.
Supp. 2d 1111, 1125–26 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
93. See, e.g., Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that
a claim predicated on defendant’s use of the word “natural” was not preempted because “there is
no FDA policy with which state law could conflict”); Briseno v. Con Agra Foods, Inc., No. CV 1105379 MMM (AGRx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154750, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) (claiming
that Con Agra’s use of “100% natural” on its labels was misleading because of its use of genetically
modified seeds); Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Nos. C 10-4387 PJH, C 10-4937 PJH,
2011 WL 2111796, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) (challenging Ben & Jerry’s and Breyer’s use
of the term “natural” for ice cream containing alkalized cocoa); Coyle, 2010 WL 2539386, at *1
(challenging Hornell’s use of a “100% NATURAL” label when the drink contained high fructose
corn syrup); Lockwood v. Con Agra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(challenging the use of “all natural” on labels for pasta sauce that contains high fructose corn syrup).
See also Ashley, supra note 77, at 266 (predicting that public interest in “natural” claims will
continue until a better definition of what is “natural” is formulated).
94. See, e.g., Coyle, 2010 WL 2539386, at *5 (staying the case pending an FDA response to
Judge Jerome Simandle’s request for advice on the meaning of “natural”).
95. See, e.g., Astiana, 2011 WL 2111796, at *2 (outlining the lengthy procedural history of
one class action).
96. See Goulet, supra note 87 (noting that in one case, after the FDA declined to define
“natural,” the plaintiffs dismissed the case).
97. See id. (describing one settlement that required defendants to establish $7.5 million in
restitution funds, and cease labeling their products “all natural”).
98. See Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. C 11-5188 SI, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162402, at *8–
9 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) (finding that the products at issue were not “defective” because the
incorporated synthetic ingredients were “knowingly and purposefully added or used”). Other cases
use “natural” to describe what one would expect certain foods to contain. These ingredients may
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may not create a warranty under certain products liability statutes.99 Yet, despite
these issues, there is a vibrant string of pending and newly decided cases
challenging natural labels on products containing GMOs, preservatives, and
high fructose corn syrup.100 The continued filing of these types of cases
emphasizes both the market importance of the term “natural” and the need for
clarity in regulations.
C. The Department of Agriculture’s Regulation of Natural Goods
In comparison to the FDA, the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) addressed the lack of a definition for “natural” more directly, adopting
a definition of the word in its Food Standards and Labeling Policy Book.101 In
2005, the USDA, through informal policy, defined “natural” as not containing
artificial ingredients or flavors and minimally processed.102 The policy lists
specifically acceptable processes, like roasting, drying, and fermenting.103
Products that undergo chemical bleaching or fundamental changes to the raw
product, are not considered natural.104 In addition, the USDA requires that all
products purporting to be natural include a brief statement explaining the term
“natural.”105 The policy does not rise to the level of formal rulemaking, but it
does provide a more concrete understanding of the term. The definition is
limited in application, however, because it applies only to meat and poultry
products.106

include molds and assorted other bacteria. See, e.g., Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 822 P.2d
1292, 1301–02 (Cal. 1992) (explaining that if a “substance is natural to the preparation of the food
served, it can be said that it was reasonably expected by its very nature and the food cannot be
determined to be unfit for human consumption or defective”).
99. See Brazil v. Dole Food Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 947, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing a
Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) claim after finding that labels on food are merely product
descriptions and do not promise defect-free products); Littlehale v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., No.
C 11-6342 PJH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162530, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2012) (stating that “pure
natural” and “all natural” are product descriptions, not warranties as defined by the MMWA).
100. See Nicole E. Negowetti, A National ‘Natural” Standard for Food Labeling, 65 ME. L.
REV. 581, 596–99 (2013) (listing many products that are the subject of litigation, and noting that
Pepperidge Farms, Inc.’s Cheddar Goldfish crackers are among the contested foods).
101. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK 116 (2005),
[hereinafter FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK] available at http://www.fsis.us
da.gov/OPPDE/larc/Policies/Labeling_Policy_Book_082005.pdf.
102. Id. at 116–17 (explaining that a natural label may be used if the product lacks artificial
color or flavoring, chemical preservatives, or other synthetic ingredients; in order to remain natural,
a raw product must be only minimally altered).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Product Labeling: Definition of the Term “Natural,” 71 Fed. Reg. 70,503, 70,504 (Dec.
5, 2006).
106. Id. at 70,503–04.
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The USDA’s informal definition of what is natural parallels the agency’s
definition of “organic” in National Organic Program (NOP) regulations.107 Via
the NOP, the USDA has provided a list of “nonsynthetic” ingredients that are
allowed in organic products as well as a list of “nonsynthetic” ingredients that
are impermissible.108 The NOP’s regulations consider “nonsynthetic” and
“natural” synonymous, and define a “nonsynthetic” substance as one that “is
derived from mineral, plant, or animal matter and does not undergo a synthetic
process . . . .”109 In contrast, a “synthetic” substance is defined as one “that is
formulated or manufactured by a chemical process or by a process that
chemically changes a substance extracted from naturally occurring plant,
animal, or mineral sources . . . .”110
D. The Federal Trade Commission’s Attempts to Define “Natural”
In 1974, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposed a rule defining
“natural” foods as those with no artificial or synthetic ingredients, and only
minimal processing.111 However, in 1983, the FTC terminated its rulemaking,
concluding that it could not define “natural” because the word has different
meanings in different contexts, and that agency resources should be used for
more pressing matters.112 The FTC still declines to define “natural” in a
comprehensive way.113
Regardless, the FTC has distinguished natural products in specific
circumstances. For example, the FTC distinguishes a “natural fiber” from a
“manufactured fiber,” defining a “natural fiber” as one “that exists as such in the
natural state,” and a “manufactured fiber” as one “derived by a process of
manufacture from any substance which, at any point in the manufacturing
107. Compare FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK, supra note 101, at 116–17
(defining “natural” as a product lacking synthetic ingredients or preservatives), with 7 C.F.R. §
205.300(a) (2013) (stating that the word “‘organic’ may only be used on labels and in the labeling
of raw or processed agricultural products . . . .”).
108. 7 C.F.R. § 205.601–205.602.
109. Id. § 205.2.
110. Id.
111. See Food Advertising, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,842, 39,849 (Nov. 11, 1974) (explaining that the
impetus for the rule was the government’s concern that consumers would not understand the
meaning of words like “natural” or “organic” in product advertising, and that “establishment of
uniform definitions for the use of the terms ‘natural’ (or ‘naturally grown’) or ‘organic’ (or
‘organically grown’)” could remedy the issue).
112. Termination of Proposed Trade Regulation: Rule of Food Advertising, 48 Fed. Reg.
23,270, 23,270 (May 24, 1983). Similarly, in 1985, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
withdrew its proposed rule, citing difficulty in defining “natural.” Use of “Natural” in the Labeling
and Advertising of Alcoholic Beverages, 50 Fed. Reg. 960, 960 (Jan. 8, 1985).
113. Karen A. Butcher et al., FTC Releases Final “Green Guides” for Environmental
Marketing Claims, MORGAN LEWIS (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/
ACPP_LF_FinalGreenGuidesForEnviroMarketingClaims_3oct12 (noting that “the FTC has
continued to avoid defining or qualifying the use of some more contentious terms, including
‘natural,’ ‘organic,’ [and] ‘sustainable’ . . . .”).
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process, is not a fiber.”114 Similarly, the FTC distinguishes “artificial
gemstones” from “natural gemstones” in its Consumer Information
publications.115 It explains that “natural gemstones” are found in nature and are
more expensive, whereas “laboratory-created gemstones,” despite having the
same physical characteristics of gemstones, are manufactured, more common,
and less expensive.116 Additionally, the use of the term “natural” to describe a
gemstone or similar jewelry product is considered an “unfair or deceptive”
practice.117
E. The Tax Code and Other Consumer Product Definitions
Other agencies and entities have similarly followed the FDA’s
synthetic/natural approach when dealing with consumer products. The Federal
Tax Code defines “natural” in certain cases in order to determine applicable
excise taxes for food products. For example, under 26 U.S.C. § 5381 (2012), a
“natural wine” is any “product of the juice, ripe grapes or other sound, ripe fruit
. . . .”118 This statute also outlines approved processes for winemaking, but
anything beyond minimal and commercially acceptable cellaring and
manufacturing procedures does not create “natural wine.”119
In 2004, the U.S. Court of International Trade, in addressing a tariff
classification, recognized that the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States does not define “natural.”120 However, its predecessor, the Tariff
Schedules of the United States, defined “natural substances” as “those
substances found . . . in their molecular structure as found in nature.”121 Notably,
this definition focuses on whether changes have been made to the product
through human action.
F. Environmental Statutes and Definitions of “Natura”
Questions about what is natural arise both directly and indirectly in
environmental legislation. While statutes define natural resources, these are less
likely to be the subject of dispute, and therefore provide fewer insights into the
meaning of “nature.” This section discusses the National Park Overflights Act,
114. 15 U.S.C. § 70(c)–(d) (2012). Other FTC definitions likewise require little alteration in
order for a substance to be classified as natural. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 250.2(c) (1999) (noting that
“[w]ood names or names suggesting wood should not be used to refer to materials which, while
produced from wood particles or fibers, do not possess a natural wood growth structure”).
115. See Gemstones, Diamonds, & Pearls, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/articles/0295-gemstones-diamonds-pearls (last updated July 2012).
116. Id.
117. 16 C.F.R. § 23.24 (2012).
118. 26 U.S.C. § 5381 (2012).
119. Id. at § 5382.
120. Vanetta U.S.A. Inc. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1316 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004).
121. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED,
1987 4–73 (1986).
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Endangered Species Act, and Wilderness Act because they offer strong
examples of how environmental legislation has codified the relationship
between man and nature.
1. The National Park Overflights Act
In August of 1987, Congress passed the National Park Overflights Act,122
which recognized that aircraft flying over the Grand Canyon National Park were
negatively impacting the “natural quiet and experience of the park . . . .”123 In
response, Congress gave the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the power
to regulate the airspace.124
Following the passage of the Act, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the FAA
had to adopt the National Park Service (NPS)’s definition of “substantial
restoration of the natural quiet,” which requires that “[fifty percent] or more of
the park achieve ‘natural quiet’ (i.e., no aircraft audible) for 75–100 percent of
the day.”125 The Court also recognized that the agency could adopt the threedecibels-above-ambient measure of audibility used by the NPS.126 Ultimately,
the D.C. Circuit found that the FAA’s Final Rule meant that “an aircraft breaks
the natural silence only when it is three decibels louder than the ambient sound—
whether that sound is the roar of the river or the song of the birds.”127 After the
D.C. Circuit ruling, the FAA changed its interpretation concerning the measure
of audibility such that it maintained the three-decibels-above-ambient standard
for populated areas of the park, but substituted an eight-decibels-below-ambient
standard in backcountry areas of the park.128
The FAA’s adoption of this standard was challenged in United States Air Tour
Ass’n v. FAA.129 The Air Tour Association argued that the new standard altered
122. See Pub. L. No. 100-91, § 3(a), 101 Stat. 674, 676 (1987) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1a–1
(2012)).
123. Id. The Act intends to preserve the “natural quiet” of national parks by creating “flight
free zones.” Id. The Grand Canyon National Park received special overflight rules, which were
finalized December 31, 1996; those new rules created flight free zones encompassing
approximately eighty percent of the Grand Canyon National Park. Jennifer C. Chen, Special Flight
Rules in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park: A Deafening debate Over Restoring Natural
Quiet, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 877, 877, 883 (1997).
124. § 1(e), 101 Stat. at 675.
125. Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 461–62 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
126. Id. at 461, 465.
127. Id. at 465.
128. See U.S. Air Tour Ass’n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Legislation raged
over the NPS and FAA’s interpretation of “natural quiet” and focused on whether the standard
should be one of noticeability (how loud or distracting the sound is to humans) or audibility
(whether humans can hear the sound). See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 461. See
also Daniel W. Anderson, In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet”: The Latest on Noise for Airports and
Airlines, AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 2004, at 10 (describing the limitations of the FAA’s Integrated
Noise Model, which focuses on the noticeability of aircraft sound (noisiness) rather than
audibility).
129. See U.S. Air Tour Ass’n, 298 F.3d at 1001.
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what constituted “natural quiet” because the FAA’s previous interpretation was
based on “noticeability,” whereas the new interpretation was based on
“detectability.”130 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, concluding that the FAA’s
explanation of the new standard was reasonable.131
2. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act incorporates human intervention in an unusual
way. Under the Act, animals that have been geographically moved by humans
are ineligible for full protection.132 This is true even if the same species of
animal is protected in its original location.133 These “natural” populations
receive the full safeguards of the Act, while the relocated “experimental”
populations may not.134 A single instance of human interaction or relocation,
therefore, can permanently disqualify an otherwise protected wildlife group.
3. The Wilderness Act
Conservation and preservation laws have advanced on the basis of the idea
that in order to protect vast areas of natural resources, animal habitats, or unique
landscapes, these areas must be inaccessible to humans, lest human presence
inevitably change and destroy them.135 This is the premise of the Wilderness
Act of 1964, which preserves nature in areas “where the earth and its community
of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain.”136
The NPS was founded upon the idea that nature consists of undisturbed areas
uninhabited by humanity.137 The Wilderness Act distinguishes wilderness from
areas in which humans and man-made structures dominate.138 Additionally, the
Act defines wilderness as “undeveloped” and “retaining its primeval character

130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(C) (2012).
133. See id. at § 1539(j)(1) –(2).
134. See id. at § 1539(j). Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the
Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1378–79 (2002) (suggesting that such “absurd results
might occur when reality confronts the legal fiction that reintroduced populations are distinct from
naturally occurring populations”).
135. BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 8 (1989) (arguing that if current conditions
proceed unchecked, changes to nature caused by humans “will clash with our perceptions, until,
finally, our sense of nature as eternal and separate is washed away, and we will see all too clearly
what we have done”).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a), (c); see Klein, supra note 134, at 1374 (“The Wilderness Act of 1964
is perhaps the best legislative manifestation of the impulse to divide the world into the mutually
exclusive spheres of nature and culture.”)
137. Federico Cheever, British National Parks for North Americans: What We Can Learn
From a More Crowded Nation Proud of its Countryside, 26 STAN. EVTL. L.J. 247, 304 (2007).
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
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and influence[] without permanent improvements or human habitation . . . .”139
The definition also includes areas that have developed naturally, “with the
imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable . . . .”140 The Act mandates
that such wilderness areas be protected to maintain their “natural conditions.”141
This definition of “wilderness” implements the human/nature binary.142 As
David Delaney observed, the idea of what constitutes “wilderness” is a perfect
example “of the social construction of nature.”143
Additionally, the Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct studies
and surveys of possible wilderness sites.144 To identify such sites, the Act directs
the Secretary to look for every roadless area of 5,000 contiguous acres or more
and determine whether that area should be preserved.145 Roads, therefore,
became the proxy for human intervention and development.146
The history of our national park system underlines the cultural history of
viewing pristine wilderness as uninhabited by humans.147 Mark Spence claims
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally WILLIAM CRONON, UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN
PLACE IN NATURE (1995) (criticizing the environmentalism movement for failing to recognize that
humans are inextricably tied to nature, and suggesting that environmentalists must attempt to
understand that relationship in order to preserve nature); RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS
AND THE AMERICAN MIND (4th ed. 2001) (addressing how changes in Americans’ behavior may
impact the future of wilderness). The focus of this part of the Article is limited to the legal definition
of “wilderness” and its reliance on a human/nature binary.
143. David Delaney, Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of (Cultural) Production,
91 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 487, 492 (2001). Delany describes “wilderness” as a
“highly politicized concept,” attributing “[t]he overt politicization of ‘wilderness’” to “the
irreducible ambiguity, if not indeterminacy, of the term.” Id. The term “nature” may face a similar
fate if it continues to go undefined. Failing to face the ambiguity of the term could lead to increased
politicization and manipulation by legislators without consumer and citizen input. There would be
an unfortunate irony in defining “nature” without citizen participation. Creating a national identity
is tied to defining the national landscape and the cultural meaning of nature. See KENNETH ROBERT
OLWIG, LANDSCAPE, NATURE AND THE BODY: POLITIC: FROM BRITAIN’S RENAISSANCE TO
AMERICA’S NEW WORLD xxiii (2002) (describing the “interlinked meanings of landscape and
nature, and the ways they have variously been used to define the body politic”).
144. See 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b). See also ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
WILDERNESS LAWS: STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND PROHIBITED AND PERMITTED USES 6 (2011)
(describing the Wilderness Act and similar statutes that “direct[] the agencies to review the
wilderness potential of certain lands”).
145. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
146. See Klein, supra note 134, at 1374 (describing the absurd results of such arbitrary
formalism, including local officials racing to construct “roads to nowhere” in order to disqualify
vast state lands from being eligible for protection under the Wilderness Act).
147. See Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 3, at 303 (“[T]he ‘preservation’ of so-called wilderness
areas was really a production of wilderness, in so far as it often involved the forcible expulsion of
indigenous peoples.”). See also Lee Schweninger, Writing Nature: Silko and Native Americans as
Nature Writers, 18 MELUS 47, 48 (1993) (quoting one Native American as claiming that “‘[o]nly
to the white man was nature a wilderness’”).
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that the national parks were created by removing Native American tribes who
lived on the land.148 According to Spence, the idea of wilderness shifted over
time, with Americans initially equating wilderness with its Native American
inhabitants, but eventually determining that reservations were the appropriate
home for Native Americans.149 Ultimately, Spence argues, Americans wanted
“the uninhabited wilderness preserved in national parks as remnants of a priori
Nature (with a very capital N).”150
The Act’s definition of “wilderness” and its use of roadless areas as a proxy
strongly delineates what is human from what is natural. This human/nature
binary is arguably so much the heart of our wilderness preservation system that
it “bears only passing relation to biodiversity and habitat protection.”151
Finally, though there is growing academic support to reconceptualize the idea
of wilderness,152 the man/nature dichotomy is deeply enshrined in the American
concept of wilderness, and it is considered one of the nation’s most strongly held
beliefs.153
4. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act of 1972 defines pollution as any “man-made or maninduced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological
integrity of water.”154 The Act’s legislative history defines “nature” as “that
condition in existence before the activities of man invoked perturbations that
prevented the system from returning to its original state of equilibrium.”155 This
definition separates elements based on whether they were created by man or
nature, and presumes that the former harms the latter when the two interact. As
a result, the Act failed to address any non-human sources of contamination (such
as contamination resulting from other animals, microbes, etc.). The Clean Water
Acts presents another clear demarcation between humanity and nature, as the
Act’s purpose could justify the inclusion of both naturally occurring and manmade pollutants.

148. MARK DAVID SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS: INDIAN REMOVAL AND THE
MAKING OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 3–4 (1999).
149. Id. at 4. Spence explains that “[a]ntebellum Americans did not conceive of wilderness
and Indians as separate.” Id. at 10.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Jamison E. Colburn, Habitat and Humanity: Public Lands Law in the Age of Ecology, 39
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 145, 175 (2007).
152. See Michael P. Nelson & J. Baird Callicott, Introduction, in THE WILDERNESS DEBATE
RAGES ON 1, 13 (Michael P. Nelson & J. Baird Callicott eds., 2008).
153. WILLIAM CRONON, THE TROUBLE WITH NATURE 24 (1995). See also Peter A. Appel,
Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 66 (2010) (describing Americans’ attachment
to the idea of wilderness and its protection); NASH, supra note 142, at xi (claiming that
“[w]ilderness was the basic ingredient of American culture”).
154. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2012).
155. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972).
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G. Do Contradictions Matter When Patents and Wines Rarely Meet?
Given that some regulations of different agencies rarely interact, it is
reasonable to question whether there is a significant problem in having disparate,
if not contradictory, definitions. The continuing efforts to reconcile definitions,
at least in consumer products shows that there must be some drawback to
multiple definitions. Thus, the Better Business Bureau (BBB), in cooperation
with advertising associations, established the Advertising Self-Regulating
Council, to minimize government involvement in advertisements, settle
competitor disputes fairly, and increase public trust in the veracity of
advertisements.156 Additionally, in 1990, the Nutrition Labeling Education Act
(NLEA) amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to preempt existing state
laws regulating nutritional labeling in an attempt to unify the various
standards.157 First, given that labeling something as natural is a marketable
product description heavily relied upon by consumers, there are legitimate
reasons to seek a uniform decision that meets consumer expectations. Both
NLEA and BBB efforts seem to indicate recognition this need.
Second, businesses may benefit from a coordination of definitions, even if
only some of those definitions are immediately relevant to consumer decisionmaking. Many businesses deal with more than one agency’s definitions on a
regular basis. Indeed, the same product, perhaps a wine both sold in the U.S.
and marketed abroad, would potentially be subject to USDA, ATF, FTC, and
Internal Revenue Code definitions. Navigating conflicting regulations almost
certainly raises the cost of doing business and creates legal uncertainties with
respect to compliance.158 Coordination among agencies would reduce both
challenges for businesses.
There may be reasons for and against including the USPTO definition within
the coordination project. The patent process is, arguably, sufficiently distinct so
as to minimize issues of coordinating compliance among multiple agencies. At
the same time, as the Myriad Genetics case indicates, when it comes to the
natural exception to patentability, the USPTO and the courts remain
substantially confused about how to articulate a definition of “natural” that will
yield predictable outcomes for patentees.159 Thus, there could be benefits to the
USPTO engaging in formal rulemaking on the definition.
Finally, whether or not contradictions remain among agency definitions,
continuing litigation over the meaning of “natural” and the use of the term as a
product selling point indicates a substantial need for formal definitions that will
156. See National Advertising Review Services, COUNCIL BETTER BUS. BUREAUS,
http://www.bbb.org/council/the-national-partner-program/national-advertising-review-services/
(lasted visited May 30, 2014) (explaining the BBB’s promotion of self-regulation and industrywide standards).
157. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2012).
158. See Shaw, supra note 12.
159. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (describing the uncertainty the Myriad
Genetics decision caused).
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be predictable in application. Such definitions would reduce business costs
within the natural products sectors.
II. CHALLENGES OF DEFINING NATURE BY MAN’S MODIFICATION OR
INTERVENTION
A. Man’s Spectrum of Intent and Predicting Case Outcomes
There is an inherent difficulty in seeking a binary answer (natural or not) when
the question is answered by investigating a spectrum of human intervention or
intent. As discussed above, in fleshing out the natural phenomena exception to
patentability, courts have focused on the level of human application. In Funk
Bros., a new mixture of bacteria was insufficient to obtain a patent as it was too
close to a discovery.160 The Court has said that it is insufficient for a new product
or process to “have been the product of skill,” rather, it must be a “product of
invention,”161 and an application must be “more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the law of nature itself.”162 Although unclear after Myriad
Genetics, purification of a naturally occurring substance appears to be sufficient
for patentability.163 Yet courts have failed to clearly articulate what level of
creation/application is necessary.
Similarly, the FDA and USDA ideas of nature require immediate recourse to
a scale of human intervention, asking how much is too much for a product to
remain natural. When the FDA informally defined natural products as those in
which “nothing artificial or synthetic” is added, the spectrum of human action
immediately came into play, particularly because the FDA did not elaborate on
the definitions of “artificial” or “synthetic.”164 The FDA’s prior treatment of
flavorings suggests the natural label is acceptable if something is derived from
a plant or animal source only, even when the substance has been “isolated,
concentrated, or extracted by a process such as distillation or the use of solvents
. . . .”165 Manufacturers have been left to wonder how much human intervention
is too much. Disputes have centered on actions such as alkalization,
bioengineering, and the use of high fructose corn syrup.166 The USDA’s
definition created a similar scale by introducing the idea of “minimally
processed” foods, which raised a question of how much human intervention is

160. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
161. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–32 (1948).
162. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012).
163. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. Watson, 135 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1955) (explaining
that the natural version of the substance at issue had no therapeutic value, while the purified form
did, and that, therefore, the purified form was patentable).
164. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of
Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466 (Nov. 27, 1991).
165. Hyman & Rodriguez, supra note 83, at 46–47.
166. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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considered “minimal.”167 The policy lists specifically acceptable processes, but
it is more difficult to determine which processes are not acceptable, such as
alkalization.168
In general, the lack of formal and coherent definitions of the term “natural”
has increased litigation risks and costs with little apparent benefit from resisting
the process of formal rulemaking.
B. Finding Ground Zero: What is Intervention/Modification/Application
Free?
One of the oddities—or, perhaps, culturally uncomfortable features—of the
idea of nature as something pristine without any human intervention is that such
pristine things may be rare, or even non-existent. Even if there were a scale of
increasing manipulation to replace the current definition of natural, those things
at the lowest level of intervention still would be suspect because it is difficult
for something to be fully free of human impacts.
We live in a deeply changed landscape.169 It is challenging to postulate a
potential starting point for intensive human changes of the landscape. In rural
England, for example, there were enormous agrarian advancements throughout
history, but historians debate whether these changes occurred during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or as early as the sixteenth century.170
Whatever the specifics of timing, England’s arable real property was largely
reclaimed from lands as diverse as marshes, heaths, and coastal mudflats.171
Scholars believe both rural England and northern Europe underwent significant
landscape changes due to “deforestation, drainage, and general settlement.”172
England’s rulers granted lands to people on the condition that they reclaim the
land for agricultural use through drainage and irrigation.173 Thus, the ideal

167. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
169. See generally IAN G. SIMMONS, CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH: CULTURE,
ENVIRONMENT, HISTORY 2 (2d ed. 1996) (describing “the changes humans have wrought in their
surroundings”).
170. See TOM WILLIAMSON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF RURAL ENGLAND: FARMING AND
THE LANDSCAPE 1700–1870, 1, 3 (2002).
171. C.S. & C.S. ORWIN, THE OPEN FIELDS 15–17 (2d ed. 1954).
172. Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, Rival Ecologies of Global Commerce, 115 AM. HIST. REV.
1342, 1348 (2010).
173. See Viola Florence Barnes, Land Tenure in English Colonial Charters of the Seventeenth
Century, in ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY PRESENTED TO CHARLES MCLEAN ANDREWS 4, 11
(1931).

2014]

The Jurisprudence of Nature

941

plantation lord-husbandman174 was capable of effectively clearing swamp area
for farming.175
The English exported this system to Ireland during colonization, encouraging
landscape-changing techniques to build the base of arable lands.176 American
colonies were evaluated for settlement in terms of how useful the land was for
agriculture after swamp draining.177 Such lands were prized because, once
drained, the swamps or bogs would become “the best lands in the province.”178
Beyond reclamation, husbandry practices generally transformed lands through
the introduction of non-native plant and animal species.179 For example,
colonists found that the European cattle they brought to the colonies quickly
depleted native grasses, and landscapes were, in turn, transformed.180
During the twentieth century, this pattern of intensive intervention continued,
creating new landscapes ideal for economic development. Humans built in highrisk areas and forced the landscape to fit their demands. Major cities and
agricultural areas developed in arid climates, draining fresh water resources and
challenging ecosystems. For example, cities including Los Angeles, San Diego,
and Phoenix have diverted water from the Colorado River for irrigation
purposes, causing it to fall 130 feet since 2000.181 Similarly, the Aral Sea was
drained of ninety percent of its fresh water though agricultural irrigation, which
created a desert and devastated the local ecosystem.182
174. Notably, it was not only enterprising plantation owners and lords who impacted the
landscape through concentrated reclamations of lands. Monastic groups also concentrated their
labors by entering “into waste places” where they “cut down the forests, drained the swamps, built
dwellings, and cultivated the soil.” ARTHUR LYNN CROSS, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND
GREATER BRITAIN 37 (1919).
175. ALEXANDER HEWAT, AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE
COLONIES OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA 159 (The Reprint Co. 1971) (1779).
176. See K. H. Connell, The Colonization of Waste Land in Ireland, 1780–1845, 3 ECON. HIST.
REV. 44, 45, 51 (1950).
177. 2 W. WINTERBOTHAM, AN HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, COMMERCIAL, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW OF THE AMERICAN UNITED STATES, AND OF THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENTS
IN AMERICA AND THE WEST-INDIES 482 (J. Ridgway et al. eds., 1799).
178. 6 WILLIAM LAURENCE SAUNDERS, THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 608
(AMS Press, Inc. 1968) (1888). Other settlers were less impressed with the potential of colonial
North Carolina because it was filled with swamps, which were “very wet and low lands, and so full
of canes and underwood, that there is no passing through them, many of which are several miles in
length.” JOHN BRICKELL, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 13 (James Carson ed.,
1737). Settlers also connected eastern seaboard swampy coasts with an increase in mortality,
suggesting that westward progress was preferable. See GEORGE LLOYD JOHNSON, JR., THE
FRONTIER IN THE COLONIAL SOUTH, SOUTH CAROLINA BACKCOUNTRY 1736–1800 25 (1997).
179. See Jonsson, supra note 172, at 1343–44.
180. Id. at 1343.
181. See Sarah Zielinski, The Colorado River Runs Dry, SMITHSONIAN (Oct. 2010),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/the-colorado-river-runs-dry-61427169/?no-ist
(explaining that seventy percent of the water in the river is diverted elsewhere for crop irrigation).
182. See Pat Walters, Aral Sea Recovery?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 2, 2010),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/04/100402-aral-sea-story/. See also Aral Sea ‘One
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Other communities forced rivers underground and built cities above them.183
Additionally, approximately three billion people throughout the world live in
cities built on the coast where they are susceptible to the dangers of rising sea
levels as a result of global warming.184 A recent study suggests 1,400 U.S. cities
are threatened by rising sea levels, and 316 cities are likely to be partially
submerged by the end of the century.185
Landscape changes are also inextricably connected to climate change, which
has been recognized for over 250 years.186 For example, irrigation and swamp
drainage are thought to contribute to local climate change.187 Similarly,
deforestation modifies the water cycle and potentially increases precipitation
levels.188 An example of climate change is the Dust Bowl of the Great Plains,
of the Planet’s Worst Environmental Disasters’, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 5, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/7554679/Aral-Sea-one-of-the-planets-worstenvironmental-disasters.html (noting that “[t]he sea shrank largely due to a Soviet project to boost
cotton[] production in the arid region”).
183. See Brian Clark Howard, 11 Rivers Forced Underground, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC,
http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/photos/underground-rivers/ (last visited
May 31, 2014). See also Rachel Kaufman, Daylighting Takes Off as Cities Expose Long-Buried
Rivers, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS (July 30, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/
news/2013/07/130730-daylighting-exposing-underground-rivers-water-urban-renewal/
(discussing how urban renewal now includes daylighting underground rivers to reduce flooding).
Daylighting also helps to ensure a supply of clean water in urban areas. See AM. RIVERS,
DAYLIGHTING STREAMS: BREATHING LIFE INTO URBAN STREAMS AND COMMUNITIES 1 (2013)
(claiming that “[p]reserving and protecting small streams is the best approach to ensure
environmental and community benefits such as clean water and flood reduction . . . . Stream
daylighting is a relatively new approach that brings these buried waterways back to life by
physically uncovering and restoring them”).
184. See Gaia Vince, The Rising and Sinking Threats to Our Cities, BBC (June 13, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130613-the-rising-threat-to-our-cities.
185. See Wendy Koch, Study Warns Rising Seas Could Swamp 1,400 Cities, USA TODAY, July
29, 2013, at 3A (describing a new study showing the vulnerabilities of U.S. cities and how sea
levels will rise if current rates of greenhouse gas emissions persist). See also Brian Clark Howard,
Pictures: Jakarta Faces Flooding, Rising Seas, and Failing Defenses, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July
23, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/07/pictures/130723-jakarta-indonesiaflooding-sea-level-rise-sinking-disasters/ (stating that forty percent of Jakarta is below sea level,
which makes the city increasingly vulnerable to rising sea levels and extreme weather events; the
city is currently sinking approximately twelve inches per year); Ben Strauss, Sea Level Rise
‘Locking In’ Quickly, Cities Threatened, CLIMATE CENTRAL (July 29, 2013),
http://www.climatecentral.org/news/sea-level-rise-locking-in-quickly-cities-threatened-16296
(showing a map of the most threatened areas throughout the U.S. based on different levels of
emissions).
186. See Jonsson, supra note 172, at 1347 (noting that a French physiocratic naturalist
suggested a link between deforestation and climate change in the late 1760s).
187. See Roger A. Pielke, Sr. et al., The Influence of Anthropogenic Landscape Changes on
Weather in South Florida, 127 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 1663, 1663, 1669 (1999) (explaining
how landscape changes in the Florida Everglades are linked to that area’s decrease in rainfall).
188. See Elfatih A. B. Eltahir & Rafael L. Bras, Precipitation Recycling, 34 REVS.
GEOPHYSICS 367, 367, 377 (1996), available at http://web.mit.edu/eltahir/www/Publications_files/
1996%20Eltahir%20Bras%20PrecipRecycling.pdf.
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which was caused by overfarming and overgrazing and resulted in a substantial
drought that lasted for years.189 In contrast to areas that suffer because of human
intervention, areas with more intact ecosystems, including reefs and wetlands,
provide substantial protection to developed lands from coastal threats.190
With such a substantial history of human impact on the environment, it
becomes increasingly difficult to identify something that is entirely natural when
the term is defined as the absence of human intervention. Is there a baseline left
against which we truly can contrast our litany of potential humanness through
the artificial or synthetic? History and social science scholars tend to answer
that question in the negative. As Steve Hinchliffe summarizes the problem:
“what might appear to western eyes as natural objects, as natura naturata, turn
out to be tangled up with humans . . . .”191
III. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Traditionally, the anthropomorphic viewpoint placed man and nature on
opposite ends of a spectrum; they were viewed as definitional opposites and
clearly exclusive of each other.192 As Karl Marx succinctly summarized, “Man
opposes himself to Nature.”193 Kate Soper explains that Western culture views
nature as dichotomous “between what is naturally given and what is contrived
(the artificial) and that between what is dictated by nature and what is humanly
instigated (the cultural or conventional).”194 Both of these definitions “presume

189. See Great Depression and World War II, 1929–1945, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline
/depwwii/dustbowl/ (last visited May 31, 2014) (describing how overgrazing dried out soil that
would blow away in the wind).
190. See Brian Handwerk, New Map Shows Where Nature Protects U.S. Coast, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (July 14, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/07/130714coastline-beach-coastal-disaster-flood-sea-level-rise-ocean-storm/.
191. STEVE HINCHLIFFE, GEOGRAPHIES OF NATURE: SOCIETIES, ENVIRONMENTS,
ECOLOGIES 14 (2007). In fact, Hinchliffe claims that “natural processes are now so polluted and
mixed in with contemporary society that they have ceased being very natural at all.” Id. Others
suggest that although culture allows nature to be “polluted, or watered down, by social and/or
political matters[,]” beyond culture, “nature itself remains unmoved by all of this huff and puff[.]”
Id. at 35. Notably, the latter approach mimics the human/nature binary, with nature outside and
distinct from man’s fiddling.
192. See Colburn, supra note 151, at 149 (noting that both “‘nature’ and ‘state of nature’ have
been put opposite human culture . . . for the whole history of the liberal state”).
193. See Margaret Fitzsimmons, The Matter of Nature, 21 ANTIPODE 106, 114 (1989).
194. KATE SOPER, WHAT IS NATURE?: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE NON-HUMAN 37 (1995).
This is not, of course, to say that Western culture has created a single cultural concept of nature.
Undoubtedly, there are numerous regional variations, and arguably, similar binaries exist even
within those variations. Our tendency “[i]n our everyday language” is to “treat nature and society
as separate entities[,]” and therefore “if something is social, then almost by definition it can’t be
natural.” HINCHLIFFE, supra note 191, at 10 (2007). The strongest weight of voices supports this
trend, and as this Article demonstrates, the belief is visible within the American legal regime.
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that there are certain ways in which humanity can—and indeed must—be
counterposed to the rest of nature.”195
Previously, there were many justifications for the traditional viewpoint.
Mankind possessed the agency, culture, intellectual pursuits, and self-awareness
that elevated it above other animals. This differentiation also played an
important role in racial relations, gender inequality, and other social
stratifications; anything seen as different or uncivilized was considered
nonhuman.196 Additionally, humans contain souls and a conscious intellect,
something no plant, animal, or other living organism could claim.197 Human
physical and intellectual domination paved the way for a narrow
conceptualization of nature as outside and opposed to that which is human.
Early ecological theory scientifically justified the idea that any human
intervention would negatively impact nature. Frederic Clements provided the
popular end-state theory, arguing that all the competition and successions of
species would lead to a final “climax” landscape that would be the most natural
equilibrium.198 This “highest and best use” approach excluded human
195. SOPER, supra note 194, at 37.
196. See David Delaney, Semantic Ecology and Lexical Violence: Nature as the Limits of the
Law, 5 L. TEXT CULTURE 77, 85–86 (noting that “[n]ature is, above all, a trope for differentiation”).
A growing body of literature examines the impact of the idea of traditional gender roles on the
human/nature binary. If traditional ecology and historical religious views considered man separate
from nature because of man’s intelligence, spirituality, and consciousness, then immediate
implications flow from feminizing “Mother Nature.” See also DOREEN MASSEY, SPACE, PLACE,
AND GENDER 10 (1994) (arguing that there is a gender prejudice in our culture of nature with
“[w]oman stand[ing] as metaphor for Nature (in another characteristic dualism), for what has been
lost (left behind)”); Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 3, at 305 (suggesting that “oppressive gender rules
are legitimated because they are seen as natural”). The feminization of nature aligns with another
traditional and problematic dualism—that of the mind/body split in which women are viewed as
being more aligned with the body. See SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM,
WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE BODY 5 (2003) (“[W]hatever the specific historical content of the
duality, the body is the negative term, and if woman is the body, then women are that negativity,
whatever it may be: distraction from knowledge, seduction away from God, capitulation to sexual
desire, violence or aggression, failure of will, even death.”). Older scholarly works examined the
interplay between nature and ethnicity, critiquing the radicalized notion that some people could be
“closer to nature,” with those people necessarily being “subjects called woman, indigenous, and so
on . . . .” HINCHLIFFE, supra note 191, at 17. See also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 590 (1823), (stating that “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages,
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave
them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness”); Glen Elder et al., Le
Pratique Sauvage: Race, Place, and the Human-Animal Divide, in ANIMAL GEOGRAPHIES: PLACE,
POLITICS, AND IDENTITY IN THE NATURE-CULTURE BORDERLANDS 80 (Jennifer Wolch & Jody
Emel eds., 1998) (arguing that early American stories about animals represented the way certain
native populations were radicalized and dehumanized).
197. See Fitzsimmons, supra note 193, at 107 (arguing that “[t]he perverse view that Nature is
external and primordial is unconsciously confirmed by our placement as intellectuals in a spatially
organized society in which ‘intellectual work’ and ‘intellectual life’ are urban”).
198. FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, PLANT SUCCESSION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
VEGETATION 854–55 (1916).
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involvement; human interference would disturb nature’s course and
permanently prevent equilibrium.199
Over the years, ecology adopted other theories, and the importance of the
climax theory lessened. The separation of humanity from the natural, however,
remained. Not until recently did ecologists postulate any human-inclusive
ecological theories. In the last two centuries there have emerged a variety of
theories of ecology and differing views on the definitions of “nature” and
“human,” as well as the role of law.200 Conceptualizations of nature within
ecology change with the passage of time and as the result of our cultural heritage
and scientific advancements.201 For example, “preservationists” once viewed
game animals as a crop that needed to be eradicated from their land.202 Thus,
cultural ideas, particularly views of marketable goods, had a strong influence on
society’s ideas of conservation and preservation.203
To understand the influence of ecology on the process of legally defining
“nature,” it is significant to note the timing of these fluxes. Until recently, nature
was viewed as conflicting directly with human progress.204 Humans tend to
place themselves outside of nature and fail to acknowledge their vital biological
role in the ecosystem.205
If nature is pristine and man is inherently outside of nature, then the
preservation of nature begins with the concept that man’s interaction should be
prevented because it negates the “natural” aspect of nature.206 Consequently,
199. See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847 (1994).
200. See Jonathan Baert Weiner, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 1, 9 (1996) (discussing the idea of nature as existing in flux rather than in equilibrium); Peter
Manus, One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Century Nature
Philosophers, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 557, 567–71 (1998) (discussing differences between the idea of
nature at the turn of the century and the concept of nature within the twentieth century).
201. See Elder, supra note 196, at 80 (comparing North American and British
conceptualizations of national parks and wilderness).
202. Colburn, supra note 151, at 162. Ideas of forest conservation were sporadic within the
United States until well into the twentieth century. See The Conservation Movement, WISCONSIN
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/turningpoints/tp-033/ (last visited May
31, 2014).
203. Indeed, cultural and spiritual ideas continue to impact modern views of preservation and
conservation. See John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 35 ENVTL. L. 955,
958 (2005) (examining in detail religious literature supporting wilderness preservation). Nagle
argues that “[m]uch of the American thinking about wilderness derives from the biblical scriptures
. . . .” Id. at 969.
204. Colburn, supra note 151, at 149.
205. See LIZ WELLS, LAND MATTERS: LANDSCAPE PHOTOGRAPHY, CULTURE AND IDENTITY
2 (2011). Wells claims the problem is that “[n]ature is both ‘internal,’ fundamental to what
constitutes us as human, and ‘out there’ in that we experience the external world through the senses,
including sight.” Id. at 5.
206. See Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 199, at 870 (arguing that after interaction between
humans and the natural environment, it is “impossible to return to an ideal state of nature”). See
also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences,
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legislation historically favors preservationist ideologies, with the primary goal
of preventing human interaction with previously untouched areas.207
IV. HOW THE JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURE DEFINES MAN AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Can Consumers Define What Is “Natural”?
All consumers have some expectation when they see the declaration “all
natural” on a product’s label. Their expectations should be considered in the
context of the spectrum of potential human interventions. No product arrives at
a store with zero human intervention.208 Therefore, it is illogical to define
“nature” as something without human intervention, because it “is an impossible
standard in so far as all food is [at least] the product of intentional human
selection.”209 When faced with a spectrum of levels of artificiality or
manufacture, consumers are unlikely to be sure where to draw the line. Indeed,
a binary outcome does not lend itself particularly well to a process spectrum.
Arguably, most consumers, when given some of the options, see a spectrum and
are unsure where to draw the line.

22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 338 (1995) (noting that modern environmental law seeks to maintain
balance between humans and nature, but sometimes human intervention is considered necessary to
address nature’s own changes (such as naturally originating fires or droughts)). Modern
environmental law is evidence of how “representations and images [of nature] that are crafted and
put into circulation have material consequences . . . .” Delaney, supra note 143, at 488.
207. See Klein, supra note 134, at 1372 (discussing the preservationist ideals underlying the
creation of the NPS and Wilderness Act of 1963); cf. Colburn, supra note 151, at 149 (claiming
that modern conservation and preservation theories merged as ecology progressed and the
population increased). Critics question whether preservation law has real, tangible benefits or if
other alternatives will better protect nature. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 153, at 93 (explaining the
view that if only “pristine” areas are preserved, other important landscapes will suffer); Alejandro
E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources Management, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1426 (2011) (arguing that preservationist laws are ineffective because they fail to take
into account the full impact of human/nature interactions in the ecosystem); Klein, supra note 134,
at 1376 (suggesting that the standards used to determine if an area should be preserved as wilderness
are arbitrary and could lead to valuable lands being unprotected).
208. See What is the Meaning of Natural?, supra note 86.
209. Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 3, at 303.
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A Potential Spectrum of Human Intervention in the Manufacture of a
Food Substance
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B. Defining Nature in a Climate-Changed World
The world challenges us daily to redefine our understandings of the
boundaries between natural and human-caused events.210 Even climate events,
traditionally considered sudden acts of nature, have been linked to human action.
For example, in Guatemala, a sinkhole thirty-stories deep was caused by a
leaking pipe system installed by humans.211 Additionally, a variety of human
causes, including fracking wastewater disposal, may trigger earthquakes.212 In
2008, a 7.9 magnitude earthquake in China was linked to the fluctuating weight

210. Bill McKibben believes that society has reached the threshold of a new view of man’s
relationship to what is natural, claiming that we are “at the end of nature.” MCKIBBEN, supra note
135, at 8.
211. See Ker Than, Guatemala Sinkhole Created by Humans, Not Nature, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
DAILY NEWS (June 3, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/06/100603-scienceguatemala-sinkhole-2010-humans-caused/.
212. See Ker Than, Fracking Wastewater Disposal Linked to Remotely Triggered Quakes,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS (July 11, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/
news/energy/2013/07/130711-fracking-wastewater-injection-earthquakes/.
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of water held by China’s Zipingpu Dam.213 Similarly, urbanization significantly
contributes to flooding, because rain overwhelms urban drainage systems and
there are no longer enough porous surfaces in hardened land to absorb the excess
water.214
Kate Soper defines nature as “those material structures and processes that are
independent of human activity (in the sense that they are not a humanly created
product) . . . .”215 Under this definition, an earthquake created by natural gas
drilling would likely be considered unnatural, but the result is less clear with
regard to a hurricane that resulted from natural causes and gained strength
because of a man-made increase in precipitation, or which had a greater impact
because of the development-fueled loss of wetlands.216
The traditional human/nature binary, which is haphazardly and partially
codified into our laws and informal regulations, does not provide an adequate
basis for dealing with these complicated questions. Nor does the binary position
us to accept and respond to the demands of climate change. Indeed, such cultural
hang-ups may well explain the continuing presence of those who deny climate
change.
V. FINDING A NEW VOCABULARY FOR NATURE IN PROPERTY RIGHTS
Consumers are not as well equipped to define “natural” as they assume.217
This idea suggests that, while their instincts should be taken into account in
rulemaking definitions, such rulemaking is not effectively replaced by a simple
213. See Oded Balilty, Photos: How Humans Can Trigger Earthquakes, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Feb. 10, 2009), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/02/photogalleries/humans-causeearthquakes/. Human-caused global warming causes ice sheets to melt, which can “release pentup energy and trigger massive earthquakes.” Mason Inman, Melting Ice Sheets Can Cause
Earthquakes, Study Finds, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 14, 2008), http://news.national
geographic.com/news/2008/03/080314-warming-quakes.html.
214. See Katie Mika, Costs Of Chronic Urban Flooding Drain Money Out Of Local Economies
and Governments, THE RIVER BLOG (July 8, 2013), http://www.americanrivers.org/blog/costs-ofchronic-urban-flooding-drain-money-out-of-local-economies-and-governments-2/ (noting that
“[u]p to 25% of economic damages caused by flooding occur because runoff overwhelms urban
drainage systems . . . .”).
215. SOPER, supra note 194, at 132.
216. Interestingly, the Disaster Relief Act as codified defines a “major disaster” as a “natural
catastrophe” such as a hurricane, tornado, or earthquake. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2012). See also Jill
M. Fraley, What We Can Predict and Affect, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/18/natural-disasters-or-acts-of-god/humans-can-predict-andaffect-what-once-were-acts-of-god (suggesting that the “acts of God” doctrine is on the decline
because many natural events are now foreseeable).
217. Editorial, Is It Really Gluten Free?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A22 (stating “most
consumers” believe there is no real meaning to the words “lite” and “low carb”). This makes some
sense with regard to the term “lite,” but is debatable with regard to “low carb.” Although the
average consumer might not know if the descriptor referred to carbohydrates below a specific
number of grams or compared to the typical product, it would seem that such a specific statement
would possess some content. If the New York Times is correct about this (unsupported) statement,
perhaps consumers are less sure of what “natural” means than we expect them to be.
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common sense understanding of the word. Instead, there are substantial benefits
to a clear definition for consumers, who would be better informed in their
purchasing decisions, and for businesses, where a coordinated definition would
prevent unwieldy compliance problems across agencies. Most importantly,
rulemaking would offer citizens a voice in the debate before politics and
corporate litigation relieves them of the opportunity. If the meaning of nature is
“multiple, shifting, and unstable,”218 then perhaps it is possible to stabilize a
definition through formal processes that accommodate citizen voices.
A. Defining “Nature” and Property Rights in Patents
Property rights may provide one lens for focusing efforts to define “natural.”
In the context of patents, there is an explicit link between the “natural” definition
and property, because the natural phenomena exception to patentability defeats
a potential property right.219 One of the justifications for the exception explicitly
relies on the public versus private property distinction. Although the Court has
been careful to clarify that a patent is a unique form of private property because
of its public purpose, and therefore not necessarily comparable to other forms of
property,220 this caveat merely emphasizes how significant the public/private
property distinction is with regard to patents. Increasingly, the distinction is at
the heart of the natural exception to patentability. As the Supreme Court
explained in Funk Bros., patents will not be granted for discoveries of natural
phenomena because natural phenomena “are part of the storehouse of knowledge
of all men.”221 A person could not own them, even temporarily, because these
things are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”222
Adopting a property rights approach to defining “naturalness” in the patent
context would be consistent with Myriad Genetics, but more importantly, it
might offer a building point. One of the issues with Myriad Genetics, and other
decisions in its line, is the lack of a precise test or specific tools for determining
the threshold of when human intervention tips something toward the artificial
and away from the natural. The result is a frustrating lack of predictable case
outcomes.

218. Michael Watts, Nature: Culture, in SPACES OF GEOGRAPHICAL THOUGHT:
DECONSTRUCTING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY’S BINARIES 142, 144 (Paul Cloke & Ron Johnston eds.,
2005).
219. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. A patent is, by its very nature, a private
monopoly, although one of limited duration. See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169,
185 (1896) (noting that a patent only lasts for a limited time, and “on the termination of the patent[,]
there passes to the public the right to make the [product] in the form in which it was constructed
during the patent”).
220. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (explaining
the intrinsic public policy of promoting the sciences and arts, making patents a unique property
right).
221. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
222. Id.
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In Myriad Genetics, the Court recites the law of nature exception and then
explains general patent protection reasoning, specifically, the importance of
fostering creativity and providing incentives for invention.223 In other words,
the Court focuses on the public purpose of creating private rights. If the focus
shifted to more explicitly include a property framework, then the emphasis
would be on the public rights to natural phenomena and defining the breadth of
those rights. The question could be re-framed as whether the proposed patent
would infringe upon the public’s property rights in nature.
B. Defining “Nature” and Property Rights in Consumer Products
Natural products are a serious business enterprise that is growing remarkably
despite the economic downturn.224 Competitors are litigating the right to use
designations such as “all natural” and “purely natural,” specifically because
these product claims are valuable.225 At the same time, the product claims are
valuable because consumers believe that they understand why these products are
different from, and better than, others.226 Without formal definitions, dilution is
likely, as are advertisements that will disappoint or infuriate consumers.
Dilution of the term “natural” is not ideal for either corporations or consumers;
if the term becomes untrustworthy, then the value inherent in the term plummets.
From this perspective, any definition must value the consumer’s instinctual
understanding of term.
Additionally, the definition should take into account the costs that businesses
may incur or avoid by using product manipulation or artificiality. Property
rights are, of course, the traditional method of protecting investment.227
Businesses litigate over the natural label, not simply because it has value as a
marketing mechanism, but because they incur costs in an attempt to be faithful
to the designation and are frustrated when competitors claim the natural
designation without incurring those costs.228 In other words, businesses believe
that they are purchasing the right to designate their products as natural by
incurring specific and substantial costs that could be avoided through the
introduction of more elaborate methods of manufacture. In property
terminology, there is a reliance interest.

223. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
224. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
226. See Katie M. Abrams, Naturally Confused: Consumers’ Perceptions of All-Natural and
Organic Pork Products, 27 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 365, 366 (2010).
227. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 2 (2001).
228. See Negowetti, supra note 100, at 593 (noting that “[w]ithout a consistent definition for
food manufacturers to rely upon, some companies face unfair competition from other companies
that adopt looser standards for products they call ‘natural’”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Defining “nature” is a complex enterprise and one that should not take place
informally within isolated federal domains and without reference to a broader
consistency. The natural designation carries with it a significant market value,
but one that is vulnerable to the loss of consumer confidence. Traditionally, the
struggle of defining “nature” has been a struggle of isolating and describing the
level of mankind’s manipulations and interventions. This approach to defining
“nature” allows law to reinforce an unfortunate Western cultural tendency to
isolate man from nature. The struggle to define “nature” has not yielded
predictability and security in the marketplace. The Supreme Court’s recent
Myriad Genetics decision highlights the challenge of measuring levels of human
intervention and manipulation. The scales of potential intervention approach
frustrated a system that demanded a binary answer. To maintain consumer
confidence in the “natural” designation and to protect the market value of the
designation, a more consistent and thoughtful approach to defining the term is
required. The language of property rights provides insights and guideposts that
may more efficiently and reliably allow us to navigate the process of formally
defining “nature.”
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